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GREEN TAXES, QUOTAS AND EQUALITY
PRESERVING SOCIAL JUSTICE WHILST AVERTING CLIMATE CHANGE
Paula Casal
The need for green fiscal reform is urgent in the face of climate change. Some oppose it, however, 
arguing that such reforms disproportionately burden poorer individuals whose emissions are far 
smaller than those of wealthier individuals. Defusing these criticisms, this paper argues that this is 
not an inevitable feature of green fiscal reform. We should adopt a more scientific attitude not only 
towards climate change but towards testing fiscal proposals to mitigate it, and avoid dividing, with 
rushed assumptions, responsible voters who care about both equality and climate change.
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n THE INEQUALITY OBJECTION 
Averting climate change requires the prompt 
employment of a variety of measures, including fiscal 
measures. The latter are often criticised for their 
potential social impact. In fact, the most frequently 
voiced argument against climate taxes is that they 
are regressive and hurt most lower income groups 
who have contributed less to climate change (Wier, 
Birr-Pedersen, Klinge Jacobsen, & Klok, 2005). Even 
former President of the Spanish government José Luis 
Rodríguez Zapatero, for example, 
responded to a proposal for 
green fiscal reform by the MP 
Joan Herrera thus: 
We must address the issue of 
green taxation but we must avoid 
making life more difficult for 
poorer individuals by causing 
prices to rise even more, and 
we must avoid following the 
countries outside Europe that employ subsidies and 
price regulations, which have proven a bad idea.1 
Climate taxes are believed to be regressive because 
poorer individuals (i) tend to consume a larger portion 
of their income than wealthier individuals who can 
save more; and (ii) tend to spend their income on 
items which will be subjected to green taxes such as 
food, water and energy bills and transport, rather than, 
1 Televised debate on the State of the Nation, TV2, May 12, 2009.
say, on services, art and design. Most people deem 
regressive taxes unfair. The risk of their increasing 
inequality beyond some parameters, moreover, raises 
further objections. For example, there is evidence 
regarding the deleterious effects of inequality on life 
expectancy, infant mortality, teenage births, homicide, 
drug use, length and quality of imprisonment, obesity, 
lack of community and trust, poor education and 
mental and physical illness (Wilkinson & Pickett, 
2009). There is also evidence that equal societies 
are more sustainable, recycle more, and manage 
to provide public goods like 
education or healthcare at 
a lower environmental cost 
(Wilkinson & Pickett, 2009, 
pp. 217–235). Inequality, 
moreover, is higher than it has 
ever been and continues to 
grow at alarming rates (Piketty, 
2014). Finally, the very same 
individuals or groups who would 
support taking action against climate change are also 
likely to oppose measures that increase inequality. 
This problem is sometimes accentuated by a value-
laden aversion to market instruments in influential 
progressive thinkers (e.g. Goodin, 1994; Sandel, 2012). 
It is important, however, that we adopt a scientific 
attitude, not only to climate change, but also to the 
fiscal measures designed to mitigate it, and avoid 
the wholesale rejection of instruments that may or 
may not possess certain distributive disadvantages 
depending on specific aspects of their implementation.
«IF THERE IS NO COLLECTIVE 
SOLUTION, PEOPLE WILL 
STILL DRIVE THEIR HIGHLY-
TAXED CARS»
Mery Sales. «Ecocides» series, 2015. Oil on panel, 60 cm in diameter.
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n REGULATIONS AND MARKET INSTRUMENTS
It is common to distinguish between «command and 
control» (or regulations) and «market instruments» 
(or taxation) and to associate the first with state-
intervention; the latter with a market economy, as 
Zapatero suggests. However, in practice, governments 
of all kinds chose their instruments on pragmatic 
grounds. The US, for example, has been relying 
heavily on energy efficiency regulations because 
of how difficult it is to introduce new taxes in that 
country.
Regulations are simply strategies that place 
limits on each agent’s consumption, through bans or 
rations, while market instruments are strategies that 
involve price modifications through taxes and permits 
(Pearce, 1995). Regulations may 
involve replacing a whole system 
for another, such as cars by 
public transport or coal by gas, 
whilst market instruments create 
incentives to develop and adopt 
superior methods, for example, of 
transport or heating. Prohibitions 
and fines send a clearer message 
of condemnation to society, 
whilst taxes and permits suggest 
that pollution is a normal 
and acceptable part of any 
productive enterprise. The best 
system, however, may require 
combining both. For example, it 
is inefficient to provide public 
transport if buses run empty 
while people drive past them 
in their cars. Taxes on cars or 
road use can make the collective 
solution sufficiently popular; but 
if there is no collective solution, 
people will still drive their highly-taxed cars. Both 
approaches, thus, can complement rather than exclude 
each other.
Economic instruments have several advantages. 
First, sometimes it is inexpensive for a firm to 
reduce pollution to a certain point, but very costly 
to reduce it further. Uniform limits risk inefficiency 
because they lack flexibility. Second, limits offer no 
incentives to reduce polluting below the permitted 
level. Third, sometimes market instruments are 
actually fairer because they spread the costs 
more widely, whilst some regulations, like zoning 
restrictions, fall more heavily on some. Finally, as 
pollution taxes are administered via the existing tax 
framework, the risk of evasion is lower than when 
emissions are policed by irregular on-site inspections 
(Pearce, 1995, p. 208).
n UPSTREAM TRADABLE QUOTAS
Where critical environmental thresholds are at stake, 
taxes can involve risks due to imperfect information 
about how agents will respond to initial tax rates. 
However, since companies often treat fines as taxes, 
fixed limits may not guarantee those limits are 
respected, unless the penalty is sufficiently high – and 
then sufficiently high taxes may be equally effective. 
«Cap-and-trade systems», or «quota auctions» 
ensure critical thresholds are not surpassed whilst 
incorporating market efficiency. 
Having set a limit on 
aggregate pollution or 
consumption we may auction 
pollution or consumption 
permits of various types. For 
example, Netting (introduced in 
the United States in 1974) allows 
a firm to create new emissions 
if it offsets them by reductions 
elsewhere in the same plant; 
Offsets (1976) permit a firm to 
create new pollution sources 
if it offsets them in existing 
sources within the same firm or 
other local firms; Bubbles (1979) 
allows variation in the source 
of pollution within one or more 
firms, providing an overall limit 
is respected; and Banking (1979) 
works like Bubbles, but operates 
across time.
Like taxes, cap-and-trade 
schemes can be implemented 
either «upstream» when applied to entire countries, or 
large producers and importers, or «midstream» when 
applied to all units exceeding some threshold, such as 
the twenty megawatts line in the European Emissions 
Trading Scheme. They can even apply «downstream» 
at individual level. The fact that a scheme is upstream 
or downstream can make an enormous difference, 
as a problem at one level may not exist at another. 
For example, unlike downstream trade-schemes, 
up and midstream schemes have been criticised 
for undermining an international ethos of shared 
responsibility, and for creating loopholes that enable 
rich countries to evade their obligations (Sandel, 
2012). Some climate experts, including James Hansen, 
«CAP-AND-TRADE SYSTEMS 
OR QUOTA AUCTIONS 
ENSURE CRITICAL 
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oppose trading schemes because they are difficult 
to police and enforce internationally, and because 
it is unlikely that countries will eventually pay the 
large sums that will supposedly compensate for their 
continued pollution. Such schemes may also give rise 
to large, self-perpetuating bureaucracies, and dodgy 
intermediaries promising the same New Guinea 
forest to offsetting companies, carbon-bankers, and 
perhaps loggers. Perverse incentives may also arise. 
For example, quotas can diminish incentives to save, 
as reductions made by some allow others to increase 
their emissions at no cost (Hansen, 2009, pp. 209–
222). Or, as happened with the European Emissions 
Trading Scheme, producers may increase emissions 
to later sell larger «reductions» (Gibbs & Retallack, 
2006). 
This particular problem could be avoided by 
abandoning «grandfathering» which involves 
granting permits in direct rather than inverse 
proportion to the amount of pollution a country, or 
company, has already generated. But other problems 
are harder to solve. For example, given that keeping 
developing countries undeveloped may ensure a 
larger supply of cheap permits, the system may 
create even more perverse incentives. Auctions may 
also create monopolies as larger firms quickly buy 
up the permits and push up the prices to eliminate 
competitors. Finally, it is morally problematic to 
auction permits to contribute to aggregate pollution 
to a point where many individuals, perhaps millions, 
will be seriously harmed or killed, particularly 
when we already know who the victims will be. 
For example, we know the people who are likely 
to be struck by floods or malaria and those who 
already endure the hottest temperatures humans can 
withstand. In such circumstances, permit schemes 
that fail to reduce the number of climate deaths to 
zero enable the rich to buy licenses to (indirectly) 
kill the poor. However, whilst it is necessary to be 
aware of all these objections, we are not in a position 
to rush into discarding any method, including trade 
systems, which may manage to reduce carbon 
«SOME EXPERTS OPPOSE TRADING 
SCHEMES BECAUSE IT IS UNLIKELY THAT 
COUNTRIES WILL EVENTUALLY PAY THE 
LARGE SUMS THAT WILL SUPPOSEDLY 
COMPENSATE FOR THEIR CONTINUED 
POLLUTION»
«THE VERY SAME INDIVIDUALS OR 
GROUPS WHO WOULD SUPPORT TAKING 
ACTION AGAINST CLIMATE CHANGE ARE 
ALSO LIKELY TO OPPOSE MEASURES THAT 
INCREASE INEQUALITY»
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emissions. The consequences of 
such emissions could be even 
worse than the pitfalls of an 
imperfect remedy.
Taxes are more predictable 
(Cramton & Stoft, 2010) and 
have already been working well 
in Europe for decades, and so far 
seem less morally problematic 
than trade schemes and less like-
ly to become corrupt. Finland, Sweden and Norway, 
Denmark and the Netherlands have carbon taxes since 
the early 90s. France also taxes sulphur and nitrogen 
since 1985, and Sweden since 1992. Some examples 
of success are the Danish energy/carbon taxes, the 
Swedish NOX tax, the German energy and trans-
port taxes, the UK climate change levy, the Finnish, 
Swedish and UK waste taxes, the London congestion 
charge and the Dutch effluent charge. Whatever the 
effectiveness of taxation, however, taxes still face the 
inequality or unfairness objection described earlier, 
and to which I now turn. 
n TAXATION AND EQUALITY
The most obvious response to the objection that 
green taxes are unfair because of their regressive 
character is that what matters is not the effect of 
each tax, but the net effect of the whole tax-and 
transfer system. If the introduction of a climate 
tax is accompanied by the reduction of a tax like 
VAT, there need be no increase in either taxes or 
regressivity. If, moreover, the green tax is made 
progressive in any of the ways described below, 
there could be a net reduction on what lower-income 
groups currently pay. Second, since the effects of a 
fiscal reform vary with factors external to it – such 
as how the poor travel or keep warm – such effects 
cannot be predicted without proper research, or 
experimental introductions of particular taxes in a 
certain period and area. Third, it is possible to point 
at many green taxes which are not regressive. Across 
the car-owning community, for example, motoring 
taxes tend to have a progressive effect, as the number 
of cars in a household, as well as the size and power 
of each one, tend to correlate with income. Even 
gasoline taxes are not as regressive as normally 
assumed (Poterba, 1991). A study of European 
taxes on transport fuel found the evidence of their 
regressivity weak (Sterner, 2012) and an Italian study 
found no regressivity (Tiezzi, 2005). Much depends 
on how regressivity is measured, on various aspects 
of the tax’s implementation, 
and on how the revenue is 
employed. Moreover, it is not 
too difficult to design a carbon 
tax that imposes a higher rate 
on those who consume carbon 
above a threshold, and again at 
an even higher rate on those who 
consume above a second, higher 
threshold. Part of the force 
of the objection rests on the 
plausible assumption that there is a fairly systematic 
coincidence between those who consume more, 
and those who can consume more (the rich). This 
assumption simplifies the search for solutions, which 
include the following:
Luxury taxes
An obvious, non-regressive solution involves «luxury 
taxes» on items like second homes, tropical woods, 
international flights and holidays, fast cars, speed 
«IF THE GREEN TAX IS MADE 
PROGRESSIVE, THERE 
COULD BE A NET REDUCTION 
ON WHAT LOWER-INCOME 
GROUPS CURRENTLY PAY»
The lower the income of an individual (represented with the 
worker on the right), the more they will tend to spend all of 
it on green-taxed items, so their entire income (but only a 
small fraction of a higher income, represented with the white-
collar executive on the left) would be subject to the green tax. 
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boats, jet skis, and sports utility vehicles which poor 
people are unlikely to purchase. 
Tax Rebates
A second option involves taxing all items and either 
introducing partial or total exemptions for necessities 
or rebating a fixed amount to each taxpayer annually. 
Imagine, for example, a rebate equalling the tax rate 
multiplied by the minimum wage. Supposing the 
annual minimum wage was $10,000, and the tax 
rate was 15%, the rebate would be $1,500. Thus, a 
minimum wage earner spending all his income will 
pay no expenditure taxes. Since modest rebates are 
hardly progressive among the wealthy, some authors 
combine them with progressive income taxes for high-
income groups (McCaffery, 1992). Regarding children, 
perhaps half an adult rebate could be granted per child 
to a maximum of two per family. This system can be 
employed to tax all spending, to tax mainly or only 
environmental consumption, or to tax something even 
more specific, like carbon, by taxing fuels at source 
and distributing the revenue equally, as James Hansen 
has proposed (2009, pp. 209–222).
Progressive expenditure taxes with environmental 
taxes
An individual’s expenditure, 
which is the result of subtracting 
a person’s savings from her 
income, can easily be subjected 
to a progressive tax (Fellows, 
1994; Frank & Cook, 1995; 
Seidman, 1999). Since this will 
involve taxing all spending, 
environmental consumption 
would have to be subject to 
additional taxes, which could 
themselves be luxury taxes, taxes 
on carbon and other substances, 
or both. 
Environmental debit cards
The environmental impact of an individual’s 
consumption can be recorded much as we record 
individual savings. Individuals may be able to 
purchase goods without any additional charge, so 
long as they have not used up their allowance. If they 
do, incurring an «ecological debt», they will pay a 
surcharge, which will increase the more they spend. 
The scheme might focus on the amount of carbon 
an individual uses and count only a few items like 
housing, flights, cars, boats, bikes, petrol and energy. 
Additional items can be added after the pilot phase, 
including non-carbon global-
warming agents. Depending 
on political feasibility, and 
how much, and how urgently, 
consumption of certain resources 
must be reduced, the relevant 
authorities would determine the 
amounts that individuals will be 
permitted to consume tax-free, 
and the rate to be imposed on 
those who exceed it. 
A tax-free ration can be 
justified by appealing to 
sufficiency principles that grant special status to the 
satisfaction of our basic needs (Casal, 2007) and 
by noting that what is objectionable, and taxable, is 
not consumption as such but rather consumption 
exceeding some threshold. For example, the Dutch 
carbon and energy tax on households and small 
businesses applies only for use between 800–170,000 
m3 of gas and 800–50,000 kWh of electricity, 
in recognition of the impossibility of reducing 
consumption to zero.
Exemptions, however, do not eliminate regressivity 
and neither the individuals below the threshold 
«IT IS MORALLY 
PROBLEMATIC TO AUCTION 
PERMITS TO CONTRIBUTE 
TO AGGREGATE POLLUTION 
TO A POINT WHERE MANY 
INDIVIDUALS WILL BE 
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nor those far above it may be motivated to reduce 
consumption further. Both problems disappear, though, 
when tax rates rise as an individual’s consumption 
above the relevant threshold also increases. Imagine 
that transactions are computer-monitored, and 
depending on the buyer’s consumption history, a 
different rate is automatically applied. For example, 
one might be allowed to consume n units of carbon at 
a zero tax rate, and then taxed at 10% for the next n 
units, 20% for the subsequent n units, and so on.
Payment cards with a magnetic strip indicating 
consumption histories could monitor environmental 
consumption. Electronic cards also allow the 
introduction of a mechanism to discourage short-
«A SYSTEM OF INDIVIDUAL TRADABLE 
QUOTAS MAY STILL HELP TO DIMINISH NOT 
ONLY POLLUTION BUT ALSO INEQUALITY, 
SINCE INDIVIDUALS WHO CONSUME LESS 
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sighted overspending (Galle, 2011). To secure 
compliance, appropriate discounts could be obtained 
only by presenting the card. If other taxes are not 
reduced to preserve tax neutrality, the additional 
revenue could finance environmental improvements 
or a basic income that frugal consumers could derive 
by selling their unused permits to the state. Black 
markets may develop, but if penalties are high, taking 
risks for small items would be irrational, and hiding 
large purchases like cars and houses is not easy. Most 
people do not disguise their income as someone 
else’s to pay lower taxes and 
may be even more reluctant to 
declare their homes or vehicles 
as somebody else’s. Besides 
steep fines, they may end up with 
invalid licenses or insurance 
claims or sales that fall through. 
In addition, there is another 
option.
n  DOWNSTREAM TRADABLE 
QUOTAS
All consumption permits could 
be exchanged in a permits 
market, not a black market but 
an authorised one. Consequently, 
all permits will have the same price and the initial 
progressivity will disappear. It would become a cap-
and-trade system at individual level. At this level, 
concerns with mid and upstream schemes, like those 
regarding monopolies, international enforcement or 
complex bureaucracies, may not arise. In addition, the 
scheme may still help to diminish not only pollution 
but also inequality – since individuals who consume 
less will have more permits to sell. The scheme 
could support a basic income, unconditional upon 
willingness to work but sensitive to consumption 
habits. This method of financing basic income is 
less likely to generate resentment on the part of the 
industrious or to dampen incentives to work than one 
financed exclusively through income taxes. 
 David Miliband, a politician who is ideologically 
close to Zapatero, proposed a scheme of personalised, 
tradable carbon allowances when he was Secretary 
of State for the Environment (House of Commons 
Environmental Audit Committee, 2008; Toynbee, 
2006). Unfortunately, Miliband’s proposal was then 
forgotten without even entering a trial phase. Now, 
since Spain is one of the European countries expected 
to be more seriously affected by climate change, as 
well as one of those falling behind regarding green 
fiscal reform, we now ought to take up the torch, and 
model and test fair and effective green tax reforms. 
We now have many methods to avoid regressivity, 
and surveys show Spanish citizens are ready for and 
favour a green tax reform (Hanemann, Labandeira, 
& Loureiro, 2011). It is politicians that now need to 
change. 
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«SINCE SPAIN IS ONE OF 
THE EUROPEAN COUNTRIES 
EXPECTED TO BE MORE 
SERIOUSLY AFFECTED BY 
CLIMATE CHANGE, WE NOW 
OUGHT TO TAKE UP THE 
TORCH, AND MODEL AND 
TEST FAIR AND EFFECTIVE 
GREEN TAX REFORMS»
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